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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 4/81)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED COAL PRODUCTION

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Dec 80 pp 253-261

[Article: "Good Luck--the Future of German Coal"]

[Text] Coal is in demand again. Within 10 years, the industrialized countries want to double their output. The situation in regard to Germany's Ruhr [German coal and steel region] coal can throw light on the question whether this will be possible and at what price this policy can be implemented.

Whenever the multinational oil companies register another unsuccessful test drilling in the German North Sea, the managers of the Essen Ruhrkohle AG [Ruhr Coal, Inc.] are radiant with joy. This satisfaction is triggered not by malicious gloating, but by the respective soil samples of the oil prospectors. The samples give evidence of huge coal reserves on Germany's sea bed.

For example, a drilling that was carried out 50 kilometers north of Norderney Island disclosed--below a rock stratum over 4 kilometers thick--eight seams comprising a coal bed nearly 7 meters thick. Since they leave untouched the prospecting budget of Ruhrkohle AG, Dr Helmut Ruerup, the company's chief surveyor (technical designation: chief surveyor of mines), is quite pleased about this free information from the North Sea: "First let's sponge a little."

The coal find in as yet unreachable marine depths illuminates the energy situation of the Federal Republic. Although Germany's domestic hard-coal reserves are immense (20 billion tons of technologically attainable pit coal) the Federal Republic has so far been meeting 50 percent of its energy requirements with imported oil. However, since the liquid gold has become scarcer and also more expensive, the politicians, industrialists and heating system owners in the FRG are again considering the black diamonds in the home soil. Already, entire industrial branches such as the cement industry are remorsefully switching back from heavy oil to the presently cheaper coal; home owners--concerned about potential emergency situations--are stockpiling a few hundredweights of briquettes, and gas suppliers and filling station leaseholders are making arrangements for obtaining energy supplies in the form of refined coal.

Since in view of an uncertain energy future domestic coal offers the best guarantees in regard to uninterrupted energy supply, the Bonn politicians have again given priority to coal. Along with the leaders of the Western industrialized

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states, Bonn solemnly promised at the Venice economic summit last summer: "Through joint efforts, we intend to double coal production and utilization by the beginning of the 1990's." The optimism of the politicians is corroborated by 80 energy experts from 16 countries, who in the world coal study recently predicted an expansion of the world's coal output from 2.5 billion tons in 1977 to 6.8 billion tons by the turn of the millennium.

In the Federal Republic, however, where--in contrast to the United States or Australia--hard coal is not accessible through open-pit mining, the fuel changeover from oil back to coal necessitates considerable effort. In the mid-1950's, the German coal mines still produced as much as 150 million tons of hard coal units (SKE); after years of unequal competition with the dirt-cheap and convenient oil, this volume has declined to the present 87 million tons SKE. The lion's share (over 80 percent) of this energy package from the coal pits on the Ruhr and Saar rivers, near Aachen and Ibbenbueren is produced by the Essen Ruhrkohle AG (turn-over: DM 7 billion; 134,216 employees) with its 27 coal mines on the Lower Rhine and on the Emscher and Lippe rivers. Even in the event of sharply intensified coal utilization, Ruhrkohle AG would carry the main burden.

To attain the declared objective of the Venice economic summit, namely through joint efforts to double the coal output by 1990, certain special exertions are called for. Thus, in order to double Ruhrkohle's present annual output of nearly 63 million tons, it will be necessary to

- establish 25 new mines in the countryside, e.g. within sight of the idyllic country town of Muenster;
- invest DM 50 billion;
- train 90,000 additional miners.

However, even such a forced effort would not succeed by 1990, since the setting up of just one new colliery takes from 12 to 15 years--not including delays caused by environmental protection initiatives. Without establishing collieries on former grain fields, Ruhrkohle AG would under no circumstances be able to double its output. For the merciless competition with oil has forced the Essen managers to take intensive rationalization measures that leave hardly any production reserves. For example:

- Between 1970 and 1979, the number of Ruhrkohle mines dropped from 53 to 27; at the same time, however, the daily output per colliery increased by one-third, from 6,500 to 9,300 tons;
- the output of a miner at the face doubled--from 2 tons in 1960 to the present 4 tons per shift;
- the degree of mechanization in the adits reached the dream mark of 99 percent.

The worthy miner who in a stooped position wields his hoe and who--dripping with sweat--wrests the black treasure from the mountain now exists only as an exhibit in the Bochum Mining Museum. Instead, heavy automatic coal cutters carve the black diamonds out of the rock. Wooden pit props that formerly had to be made to measure in a laborious process are no longer used. Hydraulically, iron props are wedged into the openings; at the same time, these props press a shield under the rock ceiling, thus protecting the miners from rock slides. Like an armored centipede, these shield props follow the coal cutter into the mountain; they are accompanied to the coal face by a conveyor belt, onto which the coal pieces drop automatically.

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According to the informed judgment of Ruhrkohle's production manager, Joachim Scholz, in front of the hole where--according to an old saying--it is supposed to be dark, the situation is particularly rosy: "We have attained full mechanization."

In the Nordstern Mine, for example, a number of miners no longer dirty their hands in extracting coal. Stationed aboveground and dressed like white-collar workers, they operate control consoles: Pressing buttons and activating electronic signals, they move the coal cutters working 1,000 meters below the surface.

Since machines have been replacing muscle power, the underground collieries expand like small towns. Thus the General Blumenthal Mine owns a pit system comprising 75 kilometers of rock drifts and 30 kilometers of coal seams. In one of Ruhrkohle's large-scale pits, the transport system has to handle 14,000 tons of coal, 4,000 tons of rock, 1,500 tons of materials and 3,200 workers per day--a difficult logistical task.

Production planner Scholz describes the problem: "If you make the pit a bottle-neck, you are bound to bring production to a standstill." In the Haus Aden Mine, one no longer hears the miners' cry of dismay--"Foreman, no empties!"--that used to signal a delay in the arrival of new coal tubs. A computer now controls the underground conveyor belts: If it anticipates a conveyor belt overload at the mouth of the transport routes, it automatically drops ballast into the bunkers along the line so as to insure a continuous coal flow from the working face. In the event of an interruption of supply on the part of the coal cutter, the electronic coolie draws on the bunker reserves so as to prevent any interruption of the coal flow.

However impressive such rationalization results are, they cannot obscure the fact that a number of measures toward insuring a stable energy supply were left undone on account of a lack of funds. Up to 1973, Ruhrkohle AG was not able to engage in the large-scale prospecting work that is urgently necessary, because

- new seams must be developed just to maintain the present production volume;
- future working fields north of the Emscher River and on the Lower Rhine are located below increasingly thick rock formations;
- only detailed previous knowledge of the location and quality of the coal seams can prevent million-mark losses in the construction of new, large-scale pit systems.

What coal beds in the Ruhr district can be mined depends on the thickness of the rock formations above the coal and on the depth below the surface, at which the deposits are located. For rock pressure, high temperatures and mine gas impose limits that presently cannot be overcome even with advanced engineering.

At present, the Essen Ruhrkohle engineers consider worth mining only those seams that lie below rock formations of no more than 1,200 meters in diameter and that are no deeper than 1,500 meters below the surface. Thus the difficulties increase the further northward one proceeds, for the coal deposits are found at lower and lower levels, until they finally disappear in the North Sea under rock formations 5,000 meters thick.

Consequently, in order to be able systematically to raise the energy treasure of the future, the coal producers must obtain accurate information--through drillings and artificially produced earthquakes--on the underground conditions at the

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periphery of the coal field. In order to obtain more information on the coal quality and seam trends, the engineers carry out one drilling per square kilometer of search area. In regard to the risk involved, Chief Surveyor of Mines Ruerup says: "If we drill at the wrong spot, we produce zero results and lose DM 1 million." So far, 172 drillings have pierced the ground at the periphery of the district. According to Ruerup, just the exploratory work required to maintain Ruhrkohle's present production volume until 1990 necessitates an investment of DM 600 million.

To establish new collieries in the countryside, Ruerup needs--in addition to money--several years of "preparatory exploration." According to the estimates of Ruhrkohle planners, it takes 12 to 15 years and an investment of nearly DM 2 billion for the prospecting work, the construction of pits and buildings and the laying of the rail network, before the first ton of coal can be produced. So the time involved is three times as long as a legislative session of the Bundestag [Lower House]--a fact that Ruerup illustrates this way: "The executive board would now have to make the decision to spend billions, in order to obtain results after over 10 years, when the coal policy may be determined by others."

Aside from the promises of the politicians, production planner Scholz considers the interest of the coal buyers another important unknown quantity in the calculations concerning future production, even though the long-term agreement with the power producers signals increasingly favorable prospects for German hard coal.

At present production costs of between DM 160 and 180 per ton of coal produced at a depth of 1,000 meters, the coal buyers are not prepared to commit themselves to purchases of the Ruhr coal of tomorrow that will be increasingly hard to mine, as long as they can still hope to obtain cheaper import coal. In Scholz' view, however, investments of billions of marks can be justified only "if in marketing the coal produced in 1995 we can cover our expenses."

Out of this conflict--greater marketing expectations on the one hand and concern about a cost-recovering and competitive price on the other hand--the German coal mining industry is holding out to the politicians the hope for a moderate expansion of production. Ruhrkohle boss Dr Karlheinz Bumd feels the German hard-coal mines are capable of increasing their present output of 85.8 million tons to 90 million in 1985 and to 100 million at the turn of the millennium.

For his enterprise, Bumd has already drawn the necessary conclusions from this situation, creating a mining hybrid: the connector pit. Although not yet a new pit, it is no longer a pit of the old type. Such a connector pit pushes into untouched (technical term: unscratched) working fields, but only with a personnel, material and ventilation shaft; according to Ruerup, there is "no air-polluting coking plant, no noisy coal washing," for since the pit is a branch of an existing colliery, the coal from the new fields is unearthed via the old hauling shaft. Such connector pits

- make use of old underground transport routes and of the existing aboveground installations, thus costing less than new collieries built from scratch;
- provoke fewer protests on the part of environmental protection groups on account of dispensing with a new hauling shaft;
- take only 8 to 10 years until startup instead of the 12 to 15 years needed for a colliery in the countryside.

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In Haard, a suburban recreational area between Haltern and Recklinghausen, where there are deposits of 560 million tons of high-grade coking coal, miners descend in the middle of a forest so as to shorten the approach route to the new coal seams. But the coal from the Haard field travels 14 kilometers--on underground, radio-controlled trains--to the General Blumenthal hauling shaft, where it comes out of the ground. At the same time, such pits help fully to extract the remaining reserves of old mines.

Ruhrkohle AG has been expanding its production capacity to be able to advance at least half a step, and it is certainly not a lack of manpower that would prevent massive increases in coal output: Since the coal crisis in the 1960's, the hard job of the miner had been considered to have no future, but the structural crisis in the coal district has changed the situation. To what extent the men on the Rhine and Ruhr rivers are pinning their hopes on coal again is illustrated by Ruhrkohle's personnel director, Alfons von Bronk, by the following examples:

- Three of four workers hired this year by the Essen firm have previously worked in the mines;
- at present, 95 percent of the miners return to the mines after completing their military service, whereas before 1973 two of three workers left the mines for good;
- this year, Ruhrkohle AG has hired 5,500 apprentices, thus establishing itself as the FRG's biggest private training institution.

When in 1990 approximately 40,000 of the 130,000 employees presently working for Ruhrkohle AG will have left the firm, two-thirds of the miners will be younger than 35. According to manpower planner Dr Klaus Stockhaus, the prospecting funds that Federal Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer recently withheld from Ruhrkohle--loaning the money to destitute Turkey instead--would have been as good an investment if they had been given to Ruhrkohle, for the firm is now drawing on miner's families of a new type: "Even today, you can see a Turk going down into the pit along with his son." Ruhrkohle's 20,000 foreign workers--three-quarters of whom are Turks--have in their underground work gained the respect of their German fellow workers; quite a few have been promoted to the position of foreman. In view of the fact that in the late 1980's there will be fewer young German workers, Ruhrkohle is pinning its hopes on the sons of these foreign workers. For according to Stockhaus, "Their abilities are better than is indicated by their high school diploma."

Now as ever, high wages and the company-supplied housing are a special incentive for workers to join Ruhrkohle AG. According to Bronk's calculations, a married skilled underground worker with two children receives a take-home wage of DM 2,522 per month--a sum that is sure to amaze his drinking buddy from the foundry. In order to meet the demand for tract houses with small gardens, Ruhrkohle has allocated DM 70 million. Demand for manpower is not going to be "the weak spot" (Bronk) of intensified coal production.

As yet, the Essen managers do not believe in the promise of a long-term pro-coal policy; they still have not been given any purchase guarantees for new output quantities. However, Ruhrkohle boss Bund is firmly convinced that German coal harbors a great deal of energy for the future, however deep it may be hidden below the fields and meadows of the Muenster region: "The capabilities of the German mining industry and of the German miners exceed the modest view the miners and industry have of themselves."

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

ITALY

SOLAR POWER EXCLUDED FROM NEW NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Dec 80 pp 182-185

[Text] The construction of EURELIOS in a record time might seem to be the first decisive step towards the intensive utilization of the most abundant and widespread form of energy available on earth. But, at least judging from the draft (not yet final) of the new National Energy Plan (PEN) prepared by the Ministry of Industry, it is not so. A very marginal role has been assigned to the sun within the next 10 years.

To take the lion's share in the new PEN are petroleum, natural gas, coal and nuclear power. Petroleum, even 10 years from now, will still be the most important energy raw material but will have experienced a very drastic reduction (at least 16.4 percent). Coal will increase its contribution from its present 7.7 percent to 18 percent; the percentage increase for natural gas will be 3 points and for the nuclear power 4.6.

Coal is a well-known raw material of which there are enormous reserves in existence. As a potential substitute for petroleum either in the chemical industry or as a source of energy it has been rediscovered only recently. PEN foresees its use in reconverted petroleum plants and in the production of synthetic, gaseous or liquid fuels, as well as motor fuels for traction vehicles. The project is impressive: a coal duct line from Poland with a capacity of 10 million tons per year, at least three coal centers at Gioia Tauro on the upper Adriatic and upper Tyrrhenian Sea, and a new coal fleet.

Consumption of natural gas, domestically produced or imported, will increase from 29 billion cubic meters for this year to 45 in 1990. Adequately kept in exhausted gas fields it would represent, together with a small portion of crude (valued at 300 billion lire) and with 2,700 tons of enriched uranium, a valuable strategic reserve to cope with periods when supplying becomes difficult.

As for nuclear energy, according to PEN, one should have recourse to it in a "responsible and meaningful" manner. The primary objective is to build immediately five other plants like that of Montalto di Castro that can store waste for 10 years in pools close to the installation (wastes from the three plants of the first generation will be accumulated in a pool being built in Saluggia). As to the fast breeder reactors, absolutely the most dangerous among the atomic plants (so much so that the United States has abandoned them), PEN writes: "It is necessary to support and place a higher value on the commitments of research and tests."

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The cost: 150 billion lire for a fuel factory for the breeders, 10 billion for the advance project of Superphenix 2, some hundred billion (PEN does not specify the amount) for PEC, the Italian fast breeder in construction for years, that in theory should have a zero output.

In all, the Italian nuclear project anticipates expenditures in 10 years of 17,352 billion lire, which is a little more than for coal and a little less than for petroleum. And this, supposing that everything goes well, is to meet only 5 percent of the Italian energy needs.

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INVESTMENTS IN BILLIONS OF LIRE ( present currency )			
	Years		Contributions (%) from various sources for 1990 (in parenthesis figures for 1979)
	1980	1983	1990
PETROLEUM	21,315 (915 of which are for research and development of alternative fuels)		51.7 (68.1)
COAL	15,050 (500 of which are for research and development)		18.0 (7.7)
NATURAL GAS	2,350	3,550	18.5 (15.5)
NUCLEAR POWER	2,272	10,080 (plus 5,000 in fuel surplus)	5 (0.4)
RENEWABLE SOURCES			
Solar panels	200,000	1 million	Solar power
mixed water heaters		water heaters	1 (0)
Tower solar plants	---	---	Hydroelectric
Photocells	1 megawatt	10 megawatts	+ geothermic power
Wind	test	---	5.8 (6.8)
Biomasses	programs	---	
Hydroelectric			
power	1,000	3,800	
Geothermic power	---	600 (thermic uses)	
COGENERATION AND TELEHEATING	33	---	
	(30 of which are for practical realizations)		
TRANSPORTATION	2,750	---	
	(2,000 of which are for means of transportation)		
ENERGY SAVINGS:			10 (0)
Homes and offices	740	2,240 (plus 6,620 for future investments)	
Industry	262		
SUB TOTALS (1981-83)	9,155	20,270	
GRAND TOTAL (1981-90)	77,672		

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EUROCONTROL'S AIR SAFETY MISSION REDEFINED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Nov 80 p 39

[Text] With a view to defining the role which Eurocontrol (the European Organization for Air Safety) would be called upon to play beyond 1983 (the end of the first application period of the 1960 Convention which created the organization--this latter entering into force in 1963), the Eurocontrol Standing Committee began, in 1974, a study, the first phase of which aimed at drawing up a balance sheet, since 1963, of the fundamental principles which governed the functioning of the original Convention.

This study reached the following principal conclusions:

-- one of the fundamental concepts governing the Convention is horizontal demarcation, operated within the air space of the member states, according to which the air traffic services furnished in the 'upper' space (above 20,000 or 25,000 feet) come within the purview of Eurocontrol, the 'lower' space being entrusted to national administrations. In our day, such a separation is no longer justified, neither from the operational or technical, nor from the financial point of view. The planning of air traffic services and their exploitation should absolutely be extended to the totality of the air space, and should be closely coordinated with services furnished airports;

-- from a geographic point of view, if it is desired that the organization of air traffic services in Europe be effective, it must be conceived for a considerably larger zone than the region constituted by the States which are present-day members of Eurocontrol. It is, therefore, desirable to open up the organization to other European states, while at the same time taking into consideration the obligations certain members states of the organization have towards NATO;

-- the setting up of a system of route royalties, a handsome success of which Eurocontrol was the instrument, avoided the necessity of joint financing of expenditures, another principle of the present convention. This system of joint financing has proved to be extremely complex, monopolizing to a great extent a potential which the organization should have been able to consecrate primarily to the development of air traffic services;

-- the impact of route royalties on the users' economic situation and the importance of the air traffic services for the profitability of air transport (particularly for fuel savings), requires closer consultation between the furnisher of those services and their users;

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-- if it is important to closely coordinate the planning of the air traffic system in Europe, it is nonetheless indispensable that this system maintain maximum flexibility, in order to be adaptable to needs which will vary according to time and place. On considering these conclusions, the Standing Committee judged that it was necessary to modify the present convention and to redefine the mission entrusted to this organization.

Essentially, the modifications concern the following points:

-- the competency of Eurocontrol, in respect to the planning of air traffic services, will be extended to the total air space; the new role of the organization will then be to elaborate, in the member states, a control system based on a common concept adapted both to civilian traffic and military imperatives, in accordance with a method which would guarantee the true medium- and long-term coordination of the various national plans. The Eurocontrol organization will, therefore, have the task of establishing a coordinated research and development program, as well as formulating joint policies in the training of controllers and technical personnel. For this purpose, Eurocontrol will use the existing installations of its experimental center at Bretigny, as well as its Luxemburg Institute. In another connection, the consultation of the users will be an integral part of the general planning and coordination process;

-- the present joint financing program of the operational installations in the member states will be phased out;

-- furnishing air traffic services will, henceforth, be officially within the purview of the member states. However, the latter may, individually or collectively, entrust to the organization the care of setting up and exploiting the above-mentioned services on their behalf. While awaiting a decision on the future arrangements concerning the Eurocontrol Center at Maastricht, this latter will continue to assure air traffic services in the upper air space of Belgium, Luxemburg and the north of the German Federal Republic. The Eurocontrol Centers of Karlsruhe and Shannon will be exploited as national centers by the German Federal Republic and Ireland respectively.

-- Eurocontrol will also play a determining role in the perfection and exploitation of a European system of traffic currents management, in collaboration with the OACI;

-- the Eurocontrol system of route royalties will be maintained in its present form; it will, however, be governed by a new international agreement, attached to the Convention, to which other countries, not presently contracting States (Austria, Portugal, Switzerland and Spain), as well as any new Member State, will adhere.

A Diplomatic Conference in Jan 1981

In order to put into effect the planned modifications, the Standing Committee, at its 20 November meeting, approved a project modifying the present Convention, as well as a new multilateral agreement on route royalties. These documents were to be signed during a diplomatic conference which will be held at the beginning of 1981 and, under reservation of ratification by the Member States, will enter into force in 1983. In the meanwhile, other States will have perhaps adhered in their turn to the amended Convention. In fact, the number of Eurocontrol member states will soon be brought to eight, Portugal having submitted its application for membership. Those of Spain and Greece are expected.

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A Violent Reaction From the Syndical Union

If the Standing Committee considers--according to the terms of the official communique--that the new convention guarantees the future of the organization, that it "invests it with more extended competence while at the same time enlarging its audience," this is not the opinion of the Syndical Union, Eurocontrol section, which published, after the 20 November meeting, a violent communique protesting against a decision taken "while systematically ignoring the efforts of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the IATA, to avoid this muddle." Declaring that the "National Administrations got Eurocontrol," the Syndical Union stated that "the Ministers hid from the public that they were systematically attempting to get around the Convention, that they failed to keep the engagement of their predecessors, and that they have personally lost every shred of credibility insofar as their will to construct Europe [is concerned]." The Syndical Union "expects from the elected officials in the national parliaments that they will have enough clairvoyance not to commit the absurdity of ratifying such a treaty."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POLLS: VOTER TRENDS OF 1974-1979, INDICATOR OF 1981 ELECTION

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 12, 1980 pp 182-190

[Article by Jean-Luc Parodi: "Chronicle of Public Opinion; Waiting for 1981: The Hypothetical Presidential Elections"--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] The presidential election of 1981 is already structuring French political life. A great deal of effort is going into the investigation of public opinion, and the questions being asked can be grouped into six categories: /The Record/ of the [incumbent's] current term, /expectations/ of the voters, /the nature/ of the survey question, /perceptions/ of the presidency, /qualities/ of a good candidate, and /voting intentions/ and preferences for the presidency. It is to this latter type of question, the problems it poses, and the indications one can gather from the various surveys made since the beginning of Giscard's presidency that this brief chronicle is devoted.

(1) A Clear and Mobilizing Indicator

The "hypothetical presidential elections" properly so-called (1), or in other words those questions which set against each other the leaders of the four great political forces or the two great coalitions, constitute a thrice-precious indicator for the correct apprehension of the left-right balance of power and of its modulations.

In the first place, there is a clear choice, which well measures symbolically the configuration of French political forces and because of this is easily understood by the voter.

In the second place, this form of question yields a very small proportion of nonresponse, and we know that when we can get a higher proportion of the voters questioned to respond our political indicators have greater reliability. In comparable surveys (2), the mean percentage of nonresponse is 17.5 for SOFRES, 18 for IFOP, 14 for Louis Harris-France. By way of comparison, it will be noted that the mean percentage of nonresponse for the hypothetical legislative elections between 1974 and 1978 was higher than 20 percent for SOFRES, IFOP, and Louis Harris-France. Clear and personalized, this indicator is thus particularly well accepted by the voters (3).

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The high level of response explains in part, but only in part, why this indicator should be less unfavorable to the right than the indicators of intentions to vote in the legislative elections expressed in partisan terms. This contradiction results from a double movement: on the one hand, the voters drawn out of their silence by the presidential poll are more frequently voters on the right, less tied to partisan language but supportive of the president; on the other hand, because of the disappearance of a centrist opposition, a certain number of Giscard voters of 1974 have no other way to express their moderate discontent but to register their intent to vote socialist, but for the most part return to Giscardism at the presidential level. It will not be forgotten in this regard that the hypothetical presidential elections were, before March 1978, the only measuring techniques (with the desires for victory by coalition) which were able to predict the defeat of the left (4).

## (2) The First Rounds: The Predominance of the Centrist Candidates

Chart 1 reproduces all the first round hypotheticals published since 1974 (5). Examining the results together, in the most frequently proposed scenario, that which pits the leaders of quadripolar France against each other, reveals once again the predominance of the centrist blocs and their candidates, a leitmotiv of the analyses since March 1978, but one which, in light of this historical survey appears to have a longer tradition. From November 1976 to December 1979, the total of scores obtained by the two centrist candidates oscillated between 65 and 72 percent of the voting preferences expressed and, correlatively, those for the peripheral candidates between 35 and 28 percent. The general order of preference favors the incumbent president, 37 percent on average, in the lead 6 times out of 8 (and consistently since October 1977), ahead of F. Mitterrand (31 percent on average), G. Marchais (17 percent), and J. Chirac (15 percent) who only once avoided fourth place.

This general structure is accompanied by a great stability among the peripheral candidates. The difference between the best and worst results is only 6 points (between 16 and 20 percent) for G. Marchais and 8 points (between 10 and 18 percent) for J. Chirac, against 10 for V. Giscard d'Estaing (between 32 and 42 percent) and 13 (between 27 and 40 percent) for F. Mitterrand.

In other words, the mass of undecided voters are clearly found in the center, and it is in a choice between centrist candidates that their indecision is manifested. Within the two blocs, the distance between the two leftist candidates being deeper and more formal leaves less room for fluctuation of the undecided vote than is permitted by the more recent and more personalized difference between the two rightist candidate.

On the left, the constant hypothetical situation of G. Marchais running behind the real legislative tally of the PCF certainly calls for caution and fine distinctions. The French Communist Party is accustomed to being undercalculated in the opinion polls, and we know that, with the assistance of the entire communist machine, it regularly tends to increase [its share] during the course of electoral campaigns; it will also be remembered that J. Duclos in 1969 made a slow, gradual, and spectacular climb from 10 percent at the start to 18 percent



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in the final survey to 21.5 percent on election day, following a bitter campaign to win back his potential voters temporarily beguiled by the "Poherist" [supporters of A. Poher] delusion and by his brilliant personal performance. It remains no less true that in view of the figures, the PCF has better hope of consolidating its last tallies than improving them. The absence of an extreme-left candidate in the hypotheticals studied reinforces this conclusion still further.

On the right, the minority status of J. Chirac, highlighted for the first time on the eve of the creation of the RPR [Rally for the Republic Party], appears then to be of a more lasting nature than is generally believed. Occulted in March 1978 by the resistance of the notable Gaullists, "revealed" in June 1979 (in the sense that a revealer causes to be apparent something which up to then had been invisible) by the national dimensions of the configuration of the European balloting, this status of minority seems to have been established from the start of Giscard's presidency. This antiquity invites another reading of the electoral problems of Chiracism, less in terms of retrogression than in terms of relative stability.

At the center of the system, an examination of the race between the two principal candidates of 1974 shows the gradual climb of the president of the republic by comparison with his socialist adversary from the eclipsed position at the end of 1976-beginning of 1977 to the consistently dominant position since then. One finds here the traditional periodicity of the Giscardian presidential term, with the acute crisis of 1976-1977, the climb in the second half of 1977, the especially favorable point after March 1978, the stabilization at a level just slightly below that since then. The hypothetical tallies of the president have in any case remained consistently higher than the real results obtained in the first round in 1974 (32.9 percent). Giscard's predominance is facilitated by the undeniable decline of the socialists in the last 2 years. Even if one discounts the 40 percent in November 1976, which was made possible by the crisis in the majority, the socialists--as measured by the hypothetical presidential tally of their first secretary--are in gradual decline. On the basis of comparable surveys, SOFRES in this case, F. Mitterrand falls back from 33 percent in January 1977 to 27 percent in September 1979. This decline leaves him however still above the legislative scores of the PSF in 1978 and 1979.

The preponderance of centrist candidates is however probably overestimated by this indicator and will gradually be attenuated by the appearance of marginal candidates, at least if they succeed in getting past the absolute preconditions for access to presidential candidacy. In other words, the four symbolic candidates of quadripolar France will quite probably do worse, come election day, with the help of numerous other candidacies, than is indicated in the various presidential hypotheticals--this shrinkage hitting hardest at the candidates nearest the center and resulting from a temporary swell in the number of undecideds.

A change in the socialist candidate and the replacement of F. Mitterrand by Mr. Rocard does not modify the overall structure of the responses and the rank-order. Slightly disadvantaged at first by his lower recognition factor (6), Michel Rocard is gaining ground in the most recent survey (IFOP, LE POINT, 3 December 1979).

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On the right. V. Giscard d'Estaing uniquely stands head and shoulders above the pack. His replacement in the hypotheticals by R. Barre or S. Veil creates both confusion (3 or 4 additional [percentage] points of "no opinion") and a modification of the rank-order within the majority (Jacques Chirac taking the lead) and the reversal of the left-right balance of strength from 45-55 percent with V. Giscard d'Estaing to 51-49 percent with S. Veil, and even to 54-46 percent with R. Barre. The mediocrity of the latter's popularity rating added to the increasingly clear image of autonomy explains why the distance by which he trails the president of the republic went from 10 points in September 1977 to 17 points in June 1979. This relative "anti-Barrism" does not apply to Simone Veil, for whom this phenomenon is doubtless of another nature, both politically--S. Veil limiting her losses on the left better than R. Barre--and sociologically--her being a woman probably costing her support even in a hypothetical presidential race (7).

## (3) The Second Rounds: Giscard Barely Prevailing

An examination of Chart 2 which reproduces the results of all the hypothetical one-on-one races proposed by the big survey outfits (8) since 1974 confirms primarily the conclusions reached from the analysis of the first rounds.

The most frequently envisaged hypothesis, which reproduces the second round in 1974 and probably anticipates the one in 1981, a Giscard-Mitterrand confrontation, appears as a toss-up, the split between winner and loser never reaching more than 6 percent (from 53-47 percent to 47-53 percent) in either direction. The left-right balance of strength certainly seems balanced at about 50-50, with inflections favoring one or the other side according to the nature of the survey and the time when it takes place. When it is a presidential poll, as is the case here, the balance of strength is slightly, but consistently, in favor of the right, with four exceptions: in November 1974, and from November 1976 to May 1977. Since September 1977, there have been no surveys, as of the date this is written, which predict the defeat of the incumbent president.

This periodicity is in overall conformity with the evolution of the balance of forces as measured by the president of the republic's popularity rating (IFOP). Systematic comparison of the two measuring techniques shows their general parallelism, but perhaps less perfectly reflected in the most recent period. [Chart 2]

One finds here the general periodicity of the Giscardian presidential term. The hypothetical presidential poll thus reflects the general fluctuations of opinion, but in a manner attenuated by the fact that the potential dissatisfaction with the president does not automatically imply an increased desire to see his old adversary triumph (9).

These various modulations do not seem in general to stem from a change in attitudes of those who voted either for Giscard or Mitterrand in 1974, but rather from a difference in [the degree of] mobilization of the two potential electorates (10). This general stability among those who are agreeable to re-constructing for opinion surveys their vote of 6 years ago should eventually inspire research on the upcoming presidential election from the side of the new

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voters, those whose vote in 1974 is unknown, or barely seen, in the differential mobilization of the 1974 electorates. One might well ask however whether we are not witnessing, in proportion as the 1974 election recedes, and as the quadripolar remodeling of the party system troubles the memory, a greater "fluidity" in voting choices: in other words, the anti-Giscardism aroused by RPR criticism and the anti-Mitterrandism provoked by the communist denunciation should at least temporarily facilitate (verbal) shifts from one camp to the other, even should they return to their traditional behavior on voting day. From January 1977 to August 1979, for example, the proportion of hypothetical Chirac-voters who say they will vote for V. Giscard d'Estaing on the second round falls from 79 percent to 61 percent, and the proportion of those voting for G. Marchais who envisage voting for F. Mitterrand goes down similarly from 92 percent to 71 percent. The president's consistent victory in the surveys, 8 times out of 12, makes one wonder whether the incumbent candidate is not in some degree favored by the measuring technique. If one accepts the idea that the electoral campaigns habitually have the result of reducing the spread between the candidates, one could under this assumption be led to interpret the presidential score as yielding the greatest possible split. An examination of electoral shifts in 1965, 1969, and 1974 seems to support this theory (11). Continuing since summer 1977, the incumbent president's domination of the presidential hypotheticals must thus be interpreted discerningly.

An examination of the other party-based hypotheticals (chart 2) confirms the classical theorems of the party system theory. It thus appears quite clearly that a communist candidate has no chance to win and that his possible showing of first place within the left in the first round would assure the incumbent president of victory, 64 percent to 36 percent, in the case of a run-off with G. Marchais (12). It is the massive reversion of socialist voters to V. Giscard d'Estaing (30 percent of the Mitterrand supporters of the first round) which explains quite evidently this imbalance.

The phenomenon is identical, if attenuated, on the right with J. Chirac, whose handicap--because it arises in large part from the shift by a certain number of Giscard supporters to the "no answer" column--would doubtless be less difficult to overcome. It remains no less true that in the four Chirac-socialist hypotheticals available, the RPR president is beaten and each time relatively convincingly. It goes without saying this would also apply to R. Barre and S. Veil.

The replacement of F. Mitterrand by M. Rocard only slightly modifies the results: despite lesser recognition, Mr Rocard is doing as well as his first secretary in October 1978, not as well in June, when F. Mitterrand is heading the socialist list in the European elections, a little bitter in August when he equals the best score made by an opposition candidate against the incumbent president since September 1977.

This short article had no other aim than to be an introduction to the multiple surveys which the presidential precampaign is already starting to produce. From this retrospective, certain conclusions may be cautiously drawn: beyond the periodicity of the 7-year term, which confirms, if there were any need of it, the depth of the break of September 1977, and the general equilibrium of

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forces, slightly more favorable to the right in presidential terms but vulnerable to being reduced--and ultimately reversed--on voting day by the electoral campaign; the indicator studied establishes, lastly, at least a provisional hierarchy of viable presidential contenders. Even if it is clear that the disappearance of one of the personalities studied would most certainly change the perceptions of his eventual successors, the classification that can be deduced from this analysis seems rather significant. For we have seen that only a socialist can hope to beat the incumbent president, and only he could prevent the victory of a socialist, because among the latter only the two former candidates of 1974 and 1969 possess the recognition and the favorable image necessary for such a competition: three men, and three men only--V. Giscard d'Estaing, F. Mitterrand, and M. Rocard--dominate today the French political system as structured by the presidential election (13).

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Chart 1. The First Rounds and the Predominance of Centrist Candidates

	1 D. 11-1976	2 S. 1-1977	3 D. 9-1977	4 H. 3-1978	5 H. 10-1978	6 H. 5-1979	7 I. 6-1979	8 S. 8-1979	9 I. 11-1979
G. Marchais	15	17	18	14	17	19	17	20	16*
F. Mitterrand	40	33	30	31	31	28	28	27	20*
V. Giscard d'Estaing	32	32	42	41	36	39	39	38	39*
J. Chirac	13	18	10	14	16	14	16	15	12*
NSRP	(20)	(17)	(19)	(8)	(16)	(19)	(18)	(18)	(20)
G. Marchais	—	—	—	—	18	—	21	22	17**
M. Rocard	—	—	—	—	30	—	23	24	22**
V. Giscard d'Estaing	—	—	—	—	36	—	41	39	35**
J. Chirac	—	—	—	—	16	—	15	15	13**
NSRP	—	—	—	—	(15)	—	(18)	(20)	(22)
G. Marchais	—	—	18	—	—	—	20	—	—
F. Mitterrand	—	—	34	—	—	—	34	—	—
R. Barre	—	—	32	—	—	—	22	—	—
J. Chirac	—	—	16	—	—	—	24	—	—
NSRP	—	—	(22)	—	—	—	(22)	—	—
G. Marchais	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—
F. Mitterrand	—	—	—	—	—	—	31	—	—
S. Veil	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	—
J. Chirac	—	—	—	—	—	—	25	—	—
NSRP	—	—	—	—	—	—	(22)	—	—
F. Mitterrand	51	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
V. Giscard d'Estaing	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
J. Chirac	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
NSRP	(22)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

\* + 13 % répartis  
sur 3 autres candidats :  
extr. g. = 3 %, Mac  
extr. g. = 2 %, Ecoles = 7 %,  
extr. d. = 1 %.  
\*\* + 14 % répartis  
identiquement, l'extr. g.  
montant à 4 %.

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Chart 2. The Second Rounds and Giscard's Slight Lead

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	Int.	S.	Int.	S.	D.	S.	S.	D.	H.	S.	I.	S.	I.
	2-1974	1-1975	2-1975	4-1975	11-1976	1-1977	5-1977	9-1977	10-1978	4-1979	4-1979	8-1979	11-1979
V. Giscard d'Estaing F. Mitterrand NSPP	47 53 (20)	52 48 (18)	52 48 (14)	51 49 (20)	48 52 (22)	49 51 (15)	48 52 (16)	52 48 (20)	53 47 (17)	52 48 (14)	53 47 (21)	53 47 (20)	57 43 (28)
V. Giscard d'Estaing M. Rocard NSPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	53 47 (17)	—	55 45 (26)	52 48 (21)	53 47 (31)
V. Giscard d'Estaing G. Marchais NSPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	64 36 (23)	64 36 (33)
J. Chirac F. Mitterrand NSPP	—	—	—	—	43 57 (26)	—	—	38 62 (29)	—	—	42.5 57.5 (22)	—	44 56 (38)
J. Chirac M. Rocard NSPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	45 55 (32)	—	42 58 (40)
R. Barre F. Mitterrand NSPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46 54 (24)	—	—	41 59 (29)	—	—
S. Veil F. Mitterrand NSPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46 54 (27)	—	—

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		(1) Numéro du sondage (tableau 2)					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
% Giscard							
(présidentielles)	(2)	47	52	52	51	48	49
% satisfaits (IFOP)	(3)	48	52	56	49	39	41
Indice (IFOP)	(4)	+ 10	+ 20	+ 26	+ 9	- 8	- 4
		7	8	9	10	11	12
% Giscard							
(présidentielles)	(2)	48	52	53	52	53	53
% satisfaits (IFOP)	(3)	40	49	52	47	46	48
Indice (IFOP)	(4)	- 6	+ 9	+ 17	+ 4	+ 4	+ 8

## Key:

- (1) Survey number (chart 2)                      (3) Percent satisfied (IFOP)  
 (2) Percent Giscard                              (4) Index (IFOP)  
       (presidential)

## FOOTNOTES

1. The formulation of the questions differs little among the institutes:  
 "Imagine there were a presidential election today. Here are the candidates among whom you have to choose. Which one would you vote for?" (IFOP).  
 "Suppose that the first round of the presidential elections takes place next Sunday and that you have a choice between the following personalities, for which one would you most likely vote?" (SOFRES, LHF). "Imagine that there were presidential elections today. For each of the following scenarios, can you tell me for which candidate you would most likely vote?" (Demoscopie), etc.
2. For diverse reasons, some of which are tied to the type of questionnaire and the quality of the network of poll-takers, the average proportion of nonresponse answers varies by the institute. The numbers given correspond to the most frequent scenario of Chart 1.
3. It will be noted at this point that the particularly conflicting results obtained by the first two Public SA-PARIS-MATCH presidential surveys arise at least in part from the fact that by offering the interview subject, in addition to the names of the candidates, the responses "Abstain" and "Don't want to say," the total proportion of "nonresponses" is abnormally high (37 percent on average): the responses of voters who are, on the one hand politicized, and on the other culturally advantaged, accordingly have greater weight and doubtless partially explain Michel Rocard's surprising score.
4. Seen especially the Demoscope survey and commentary thereon in LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 8 and 9 October 1977.

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5. I have only reproduced on this chart the surveys made by the big French institutes or those in whose oversight I was personally involved. To be thorough, it would be necessary also to mention two Public SA surveys made 4-9 October 1979 (PARIS-MATCH, 26 October 1979) and 13-16 November 1979 (PARIS MATCH, 30 November 1979), which respectively accord: 19 and 19 percent to G. Marchais; 28 and 30 percent to F. Mitterrand; 42 and 40 percent to V. Giscard d'Estaing; 12 and 11 percent to J. Chirac (and 37 and 37 percent nonresponse)--and in another scenario 20 and 19 percent to G. Marchais; 31 and 36 percent to Michel Rocard; 34 and 35 percent to V. Giscard d'Estaing; 15 and 10 percent to J. Chirac (and 27 and 33 percent nonresponses).
6. Particularly clear, 5 points below F. Mitterrand in June 1979, the day of the European voting, while the latter is occupying the center stage and while an accident had kept his associate-rival out of the political picture for more than a month, M. Rocard's handicap reduces to 3 points in September 1979. A certain anti-Rocardism of the left is revealed, however, in this data.
7. /Are you for or against a woman being president of the republic?/ (IFOP, 18-24 January 1972: against, 39 percent; for, 52 percent; NSPP [expansion unknown], 9 percent. See SONDAGES, 1972, 4, p 164. /In general, would you be agreeable or opposed to a woman becoming president of the republic? (SOFRES): against, 32 percent; in favor, 59 percent; no opinion, 9 percent (1,000 men surveyed), MARIE CLAIRE, Oct 1977.
8. As with Chart 1, it would be necessary, to be complete, to mention also a Publismetrie survey (4-8 April 1975), in L'AUREOLE 16 April 1975, which gives 56 percent to Valey Giscard d'Estaing and 44 percent to Francois Mitterrand (against 9 percent nonresponse) and two Public SA surveys, done 4-9 October 1979 (PARIS-MATCH, 26 October 1979) and 13-16 November 1979 (PARIS-MATCH, 30 November 1979) which respectively give V. Giscard d'Estaing 53 and 52 percent against F. Mitterrand (with 28 and 27 percent not responding, 50 and 50 percent against M. Rocard (with 26 and 36 percent not responding), and 65 and 66 percent against G. Marchais (with 30 and 40 percent not responding).
9. Since the rupture of the union of the left, however, the declines in the level of presidential popularity no longer seem to have such evident electoral effects, as if a certain lack of credibility of the adversary was giving some electoral protection to the president from the hitherto habitual consequences of soured public opinion.
10. One finds, for example, only 4 percent of the Giscardians of 1974 are switching to V. Giscard d'Estaing. See LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 9 December 1974.



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11. All available surveys of the 1965 campaign give to General de Gaulle in the 18 months preceding the election an advantage greater than the 55-45 actual result: from May 1964 to November 1965 his share of first-round voting intentions oscillates between 59 and 68 percent of the preferences expressed. Of course, we are dealing here with General de Gaulle, and it is the first presidential campaign in the Fifth Republic, and J. Lecanuët, whose appearance is going to force a second round of voting, does not yet register on the surveys; but still it is the presidential campaign of the last month which overturns the balance of forces. One can hardly generalize from the 1969 situation, since, by definition, there was no incumbent candidate. One can still note, however, that G. Pompidou achieves a better score against A. Poher (IFOP, 3-5 May 1969)--50.5 percent against 49.5 percent--than in the subsequent one (6-12 May)--44 against 54 percent. In the 1974 precampaign, by contrast, at least a year before the election, G. Pompidou was clearly ahead of F. Mitterrand, 59 to 41 percent in September 1973, 55-45 in January 1974. At the same periods, and against the same leftist candidates, V. Giscard d'Estaing received only 56 and 50 percent, and J. Chaban-Delmas only 54 and 49 percent. (Publimetrie Surveys, 22-26 September 1973 and 6-8 January 1974, L'AUREOLE, 9 October 1973 and 18 January 1974.
12. SOFRES survey, 24-30 August 1979, L'EXPANSION, 21 September 1979. The two Public SA, PARIS-MATCH surveys (see n. 7) indicate the same balance of strengths; 65-35 and 66-34 percent.
13. Far behind, the two prime ministers of the president and she who is sometimes taken for their future successor, once her European term is over: R. Barre, hit by a growing anti-Barrism, J. Chirac weakened by a rightist image which he is hastily trying to attenuate, S. Veil, handicapped by the latent misogyny in a not insignificant portion of the electorate. Somewhat loosely, G. Marchais can only hope at best for a first round victory over his socialist partner, an improbable prospect all the same, whatever be the risk of hemorrhage for the socialist candidate stemming from the multiplication of marginal leftist candidates.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POLL: ELECTORATE VIEWS ECONOMICS, POLICIES DURING VGE'S TERM

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6 Dec 80 p 96

[Text] A "vote of dissatisfaction," the experts noted following the parliamentary by-elections. What dissatisfaction? And to what extent will it affect the upcoming presidential election? The BVA poll (see below) provides partial answers to these questions.\*

Has Valery Giscard d'Estaing's 7-year term brought about a change in the personal situation of the French? The answer of most of those polled is no. Except in the case of purchasing power, in which respect a negative development is acknowledged by a large number.

With regard to the situation of France, a large number of voters noted change in five areas. Almost unanimously, they consider this change negative in the case of employment as well as social conditions, world peace, the competitiveness of businesses and education.

The most positive results of the 7-year term are in health care, housing and especially France's role in the world.


Once again, these views show that the results of the 7-year presidential term are considered negative in economic and social areas and positive with regard to France's international status.

Those persons who noted a change for the better or for the worse were asked by BVA whether that was due to Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Since this question concerned only a fraction of the sampling, we did not express the answers as a percentage, but they confirm the previous remark: opposition sympathizers are in the same category as majority supporters in acknowledging that the president has played a positive role in the international area. But there are many majority supporters--about one-third of them--who, like the left, hold Giscard responsible for the poor economic and social results.

\*BVA is one of the main French polling establishments. The present poll was taken between 10 and 17 November among a 1,000-person representative sampling of the French electorate.

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Valery Giscard d'Estaing's 7-year term will soon end. In regard to the various areas of your life, have these 7 years brought about a change for the better, a change for the worse or no change at all?




## Key:

- |                     |                               |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. A change         | 7. Your health care           |
| 2. No change        | 8. Your job security          |
| 3. For the better   | 9. Leisure time               |
| 4. For the worse    | 10. Housing conditions        |
| 5. Purchasing power | 11. Securing in your commune  |
| 6. TV programming   | 12. Your children's education |

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With regard to France's situation, in the case of each of these problems, in your opinion have the past 7 years brought about a change for the better, a change for the worse or no change at all?



## Key:

- |                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. A change       | 8. Competitiveness of French businesses |
| 2. No change      | 9. Education                            |
| 3. For the better | 10. France's role in the world          |
| 4. For the worse  | 11. Social justice                      |
| 5. Employment     | 12. Information of the French           |
| 6. Social climate | 13. Liberties of the French             |
| 7. World peace    | 14. Defense                             |
|                   | 15. Workings of democracy               |

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

SPANISH MAGAZINE UNCOVERS KGB MOST IMPORTANT AGENTS

KGB Activity

LD081507 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Dec 80 pp 24-31

[Article by Jose Diaz Herrera: "The KGB in Spain"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Stavilovich Sorochinskiy, 41 years of age, an electrician and naval radio operator of Soviet nationality, had set out that morning to take a stroll with four other crewmen of the Russian vessel "Balaklava," moored in the harbor of Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

It was 4 December 1979. The vessel--a factory ship constructed in 1964, weighing 1,290 tons, 79.74 meters in length and capable of transporting up to 950 cubic meters of frozen cargo--had arrived in the Canary Islands 5 days earlier, and it was the first time that Stavilovich Sorochinskiy had disembarked.

The first and last time, since he had decided never to return again to the vessel or to the Soviet Union. Although the four seamen who had disembarked with him would not lose sight of him for a moment and would attempt to prevent him from defecting, Yevgeniy Stavilovich Sorochinskiy had devised a perfect plan for escaping.

And he succeeded. Some 5 hours later, having taken refuge in the Calle Robayna police station in Tenerife, he heard the footsteps, shouts and curses in Russian of the "Balaklava" crewmen. The entire crew had taken to the streets to search for him.

That afternoon Yevgeniy Stavilovich Sorochinskiy felt free for the first time, and with the help of an interpreter from the Sovhispan Spanish-Soviet enterprise he filled out a couple of forms seeking political refugee papers from the United Nations. Once he had secured them, he intended to seek a permit for moving to the United States, where he had some relatives. From there he would demand his wife and daughter, who had remained in the Ukraine.

When the legal formalities had been carried out in Tenerife, the island police decided to move him to Madrid. In the Spanish capital he could have a greater chance of setting his papers in order and emigrating to the United States.

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#### Disappeared en Route

The journey to Madrid was made on Iberia Airlines flight 404. Sorochinskiy, wearing a check shirt and beige pants and carrying a yellow bag, boarded the aircraft at 1745 hours, guarded by the police to the foot of the steps.

Some 2 hours later, the Iberia 727 on flight 404 between Tenerife and Madrid landed at Barajas Airport. The border police, who were waiting for a man with Soviet features wearing a check shirt, carrying a yellow bag and speaking no Spanish at all, were thunderstruck.

That mysterious electrician, who answered to the name of Yevgeniy Stavilovich Sorochinskiy, was nowhere to be found. It seemed as if the ground had swallowed him up.

The following day enquiries to find him produced no result. The Russian electrician and radio operator had left Tenerife but appeared not to have reached Barajas--neither alive nor dead.

#### The Arm of the KGB

The Madrid police enquired at the USSR Embassy in Madrid. What they learned was a bombshell: electrician Sorochinskiy was safe and sound at a comfortable residence at Calle Matias Montero 14--the seat of the Soviet Embassy in Spain.

According to the Soviet official account, "finding himself alone in Spain, Sorochinskiy felt depressed and decided to return to his country to spend Christmas with his wife and daughter."

The story might have been true. But it was not. According to the Spanish authorities, Yevgeniy, the electrician of the "Balaklava," could never have longed to spend Christmas with his family. For a simple reason: he, his wife and his daughter were all Jewish.

Instead, it is more likely that the long and powerful arm of the KGB--the powerful Soviet political police, which is also entrusted with carrying out espionage and counterespionage duties abroad--lies behind Sorochinskiy's "change of attitude."

A not overly exhaustive investigation of the list of passengers on that Iberia flight 404 did not enable the Spanish police to discover anything unusual. However, a subsequent exchange of views between the police and some of the passengers revealed that one of the passengers approached Sorochinskiy twice during the flight and spoke to him "in an unknown language which might be Russian."

According to the same source, Sorochinskiy and the unidentified traveler had no sooner reached the Barajas installations than they left the mass of the passengers and headed for the transit area, disappearing through a side door of the airport. According to Western secret service sources the operation could have only been prepared by Vladimir Volosatov--a man 45 years of age with curly hair and spectacles for shortsightedness, who according to the sources consulted by this magazine is one of the chiefs of the KGB "Rezidentura" (a headquarters for Soviet spies, similar to the "station" in CIA slang) in Madrid.

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Vladimir Volosatov, who according to the "Diplomatic Yearbook" published by the Foreign Ministry is attached to the Soviet Union's Embassy in Madrid as "first secretary" of the political section, is in fact one of the Soviet espionage services' most intelligent and dangerous agents.

According to John Barron's book on the KGB, Vladimir Volosatov was detected as a Soviet spy over 20 years ago, when he was attached as "second secretary" to the Soviet Union's Embassy in Algiers. There he already held the rank of captain in the KGB.

He was subsequently posted to Beirut, Paris and Damascus, where the Western intelligence services always detected his considerable activity, operating by preference in circles close to extreme leftwing political activists and armed subversive groups.

Colonel

According to the same sources, Vladimir Volosatov is an expert on Arab and Mediterranean affairs. He speaks French and Arabic perfectly and is at least a colonel in the KGB.

Some 150 legal and illegal agents (that is, with or without legal cover) are allegedly working under his orders in Spain. Of these, 108 are allegedly Soviets detected by Western intelligence services among the almost 800 Russian citizens currently residing in the country, and the remainder are Cubans--the Castroist espionage service known as "G-2"--Spaniards who have spent lengthy periods in the Soviet Union and have been recruited to work for the KGB "Rezidentura" in Madrid and Latin Americans exiled from their respective countries who were already working for the KGB in Latin America.

They do not lack money for recruiting agents. Although the KGB budget is one of the secrets most jealously guarded by Soviet spies, Western secret service sources estimate that Yuriy Andropov, the supreme head of Russian intelligence, handles about \$10 billion (750 billion pesetas) per year, with which he would have to pay about 110,000 agents scattered throughout the world, blackmail, misinform, support terrorist groups and bribe officials and citizens in the Western countries.

Most of the 108 Soviet agents in Madrid are "legal"; that is, they have all the legal prerequisites required by the Spanish state to justify their stay in the country.

Some 79 are "officials" of the Soviet Union's embassy and trade delegation in Madrid, and the remainder are spread out among enterprises such as Sovhispan, which has offices in Madrid, Tenerife and Las Palmas; Aeroflot and the Black Sea Shipping Agency; Pesconsa; Intramar; the World Tourism Organization; the CCSCE Conference; the TASS and APN press agencies, the All-Union Copyright Agency and newspapers such as PRAVDA or IZVESTIYA which have "correspondents" in Madrid.

But not only institutions and bodies of the Soviet Union in Madrid provide legal cover for KGB agents in Spain for carrying out their clandestine activities. Some Spanish commercial enterprises, such as Agrucosa, Segasa, Waimer, EPYR, Prodag

and others, which have Soviet citizens in our country among their staff, could thus be unwittingly used for providing cover for certain KGB agents in Spain, according to what the Spanish secret services revealed to CAMBIO 16. Some of these businessmen consulted by this magazine flatly denied alleged links with the Soviet espionage services.

On the other hand, Spanish counterespionage asserts that "one in two" Soviet citizens living in the country to work in an official body of the Soviet Union in Spain or in a joint enterprise is an agent of the KGB or of the GRU--the Russian military intelligence service.

"And if he is not a spy when he arrives in Spain," the same sources reveal, "the Kremlin will undertake later to convince him that he must work for his country."

Even so, the Soviet Union must not be quite satisfied with the number of agents posted to Madrid, since the USSR Embassy is constantly pressing the Foreign Ministry with the aim of increasing diplomatic representation in Spain and opening consulates in certain Spanish regions.

They have pressed and continue to press, despite the fact that they have already partly achieved their aims. "In comparison with the 20 people with 'diplomatic status' at the Spanish Embassy in the USSR, the Soviet Union has 60 'diplomats' in Madrid, of whom over half are also working for the KGB and the GRU," Ministry of the Interior sources told this magazine.

The "Dungeon"

"However," the same source states, "we cannot complain. In France the disproportion is far greater. Whereas the Soviets maintain 543 'diplomats' at the USSR's embassy in France, there are only 49 people officially accredited."

Of course, the Soviet Union does not believe that it has quite lost the battle in Spain to cover its spies. And thus some newspapers, the colleges and universities and some research centers find themselves periodically assailed by USSR officials, who almost beseech them to send some of their staff to study or to send news reports from Moscow.

"In return," Western intelligence service sources reveal, "the Soviet Union would bring into Spain an entire legion of 'doubly qualified' officials, whose principal duty would be to work for their country's embassy in Spain."

Because the KGB "Rezidentura" or station in Spain is at the Soviet Union's Embassy in Madrid, located at Calle Matias Montero 14.

According to a report supplied to this magazine by a Western secret service which succeeded in infiltrating a real "plumber" into the embassy when repairs were being carried out, the "Rezidentura's" installations occupy an entire basement of the embassy, with steel walls and entry door.

Inside, according to the same source, they always work with the doors closed, air conditioning and artificial lighting, so that the Soviet "Rezidentura" is known as



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"the Dungeon" ["el Trullo"] among Western agents, because of the installation's prison-like atmosphere.

Only the KGB and GRU agents have access to the "Dungeon," where, as on the seventh floor of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, the most modern and sophisticated telecommunications equipment is located.

Some of this equipment is used for picking up and deciphering the reports received at the headquarters of the Spanish counterespionage services, located in the Calle Vitrubio in Madrid, just over 200 meters from the Soviet Embassy. Because of all this, all reports transmitted by radio signal in the Calle Vitrubio, in addition to being coded, have used for several years a random tape system [sistema de cinta aleatoria]--a kind of second code--which makes it virtually impossible for the messages picked up by the KGB to be decoded, even by using computers.

Even so, all the precautions to safeguard our own intelligence are not much, in the opinion of the Spanish secret services, which during the last few months have detected a new KGB "Dungeon" in Madrid. According to the aforementioned sources, this dungeon is at the official headquarters of Aeroflot--the Soviet airline--in the Calle Princesa.

According to residents of the area, it is common to see lights burning in these Aeroflot-KGB offices every night. Three out of five Soviet Aeroflot officials, together with "diplomats" at the USSR Embassy, spend 4 or 5 days a week working 4-6 hours each night.

What is their work? Western secret service sources have told CAMBIO 16 that the task of these people is to draft reports from the material collected during the week from the various agents whom they have in Spain and to formulate working proposals, which they then send--via Aeroflot--to KGB headquarters in Moscow.

The Russian airline Aeroflot makes two flights per week between Madrid and Moscow. The aircraft crews--four pilots and four air hostesses--check in at the Castellana Hotel as soon as they arrive in Madrid, and, according to Western secret services, some of the members of these crews work for their country's intelligence services, and their main task is to act as couriers. According to the same sources, this would explain why the Aeroflot office is one of the KGB's "nests" in Madrid.

In fact Aeroflot "director general" Oleg Shuranov was expelled from Spain last 15 January for carrying out "activities against the country's security." Shuranov had to leave Spain on being caught by the Spanish police as he was "purchasing" the plans of and part of the equipment used in the communications system of the Mirage F-1--a French-made aircraft purchased by the Spanish army which forms part of the country's defense. A few days before being caught Shuranov had unsuccessfully attempted to enter the offices of Lockheed in Spain, which are in the same building as Aeroflot.

Shuranov was neither the first nor the last Soviet citizen who has had to return to the cold on being involved in espionage activities in Spain. Since February 1977, when diplomatic relations were established between Madrid and Moscow, another six Russians have followed the same path.

The Russians expelled are Yuriy Pivovarov, Gennadiy Sveshnikov, Yuriy Popov, Anatoliy Kasirnikov and Yuriy Isayev, the last-mentioned being the most important Soviet agent expelled from the country since he was no less than a general in the KGB and perhaps the person whose task in Spain was to reorganize Soviet intelligence in the country on a legal basis. During the previous political period--except for the latter years--no Russian could enter the country legally, diplomatic relations having been severed.

According to CAMBIO 16's sources of information, the loss of Isayev constituted an enormous blow for the Soviets, who even threatened to retaliate against Spanish ambassador in Moscow Juan Antonio Samaranch. "The fall of Isayev," Western secret service sources reveal, "is only explicable bearing in mind the 'greed for intelligence' which they have been displaying in Spain."

#### Curb on NATO

The same informant told this magazine that the basic aims of Soviet espionage in Spain are to discover what Spain's political, economic and social development will be, in order to be able to influence the political parties and alter it as it pleases.

The KGB is also interested in discovering in advance the Spanish armed forces' future development plans, the Spanish armed forces' organization and morale and, in particular, the state of the joint-use Spanish-U.S. bases.

Spain also constitutes for Russian intelligence one of the countries where they can secure information about other Western countries' military plans and projects.

"What they cannot spy out concerning military aircraft and electronics applied for military purposes," this magazine was told, "they attempt to 'investigate' here by bribing Spanish personnel working for Americans, attempting to visit the offices of enterprises such as Lockheed, which manufactures the most modern U.S. military transport aircraft, or taking an interest in the communications system of the French Mirage aircraft which Spain has purchased."

Over and above all these aims, Soviet intelligence is in particular seeking Spain's nonentry into NATO.

"The Kremlin is enormously interested," former KGB agent Aleksey Myagkov reveals, "in weakening Europe's southwestern flank, and for that reason they not only do not want Spain to join NATO but are also responsible to some extent for France's withdrawal from the Western defense bloc."

#### Suspicious Relations

According to Aleksey, prior to General de Gaulle's announcing his country's withdrawal from NATO 11 March 1966, the KGB's pressures had been so great and so obvious, with constant meetings between French and East European leaders, that it could almost be asserted that de Gaulle's decision was a success for Soviet intelligence.

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With an unallied France, a military weak Portugal and a Spain aloof from Western military thinking and organization, the Soviet Union knows at least that Europe's southwestern flank constitutes no immediate threat to its military security, according to experts on that country's defense matters.

"This is why," according to Western secret service sources, "the KGB is attempting by all means to prevent Spain's entry into NATO, even resorting to creating a strategy of 'controlled tension' within the country so that politicians and military personnel do not even have time to think about NATO."

Some information in the possession of the Spanish police seems to make it clear that the KGB lies behind the Basque and Canary Islands separatist movements.

Vladimir Volosatov, one of the most prominent KGB men in Madrid, maintained contacts with the leader of the movement for the self-determination and independence of the Canary Archipelago Antonio Cubillo during his stay in Algiers, and another "diplomat" at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid--Vladimir Kalinin--is in the habit of traveling relatively frequently to Las Palmas De Gran Canaria.

"Why does he travel so often to the Canary Islands," the Spanish secret services wonder, "if his post at the embassy is that of chief of protocol?"

Another, no less suspicious, enigma is the almost constant presence of Soviet "workers" in certain enterprises in the Basque country, where they go to study methods of manufacturing certain products, including the most innocent electrical battery.

Three of these enterprises, which are under close surveillance by the Spanish intelligence services, are in Vitoria and Navarra as well as other factories outside the Basque country. On the other hand, the Soviet workers have taken an interest in the provinces where Basque homeland and liberty's submachineguns chatter almost every day.

Nevertheless, the Canary Islands remain the paradise for the KGB spies in Spain. The islands, located in the very center of the "oil route," just over 100 km from Africa and not far from the Strait of Gibraltar, constitute a military objective of the first order which the Soviets wish to control at all costs.

And they are controlling it to an increasing extent. Almost 40 percent of the islands' maritime traffic is composed of Soviet and Eastern bloc fishing vessels and cargo ships. The influx of Soviet citizens into the Archipelago is so great that some "Indians' stores" in Tenerife and Las Palmas are specializing almost exclusively in the sale of umbrellas, nylon stockings and heavy clothing to the Russian "seamen," and have even gone so far as to put up the names of their shops in cyrillic characters.

Under these circumstances it is not strange that some "crewmen" of Soviet fishing vessels have "disappeared" from the islands without trace and without seeking the official exit visa, as Spanish legislation requires.

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As a result of this situation, which was reported by the civil governor of Las Palmas in issue 434 of CAMBIO 16, the Sovhispan Enterprise, whose task in the Archipelago is to supply the Soviet fishing vessels operating in the area, was fined 250,000 pesetas, and the "irregularities" have apparently ended.

Apparently, perhaps, because who can assert that the Soviet KGB had nothing to do with the sad story of electrician and radio operator Yevgeniy Stavilovich Sorochinskiy?

#### KGB Agents Exposed

LD081115 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Dec 80 p 27

[Article by Jose Diaz Herrera: "The KGB in Spain"--insert subheaded "These Are the Spies"]

[Text] Vladimir Volosatov

"First secretary" in charge of the political section of the USSR Embassy in Spain and one of the KGB's top chiefs in Madrid.

Between 1957 and 1959 he was posted to Lebanon. From 1960 to 1963 he stayed in Syria. From 1963 to 1966 he was in Algeria, and until the end of 1971, in Paris.

He arrived in Spain 28 June 1977. He is married to Irina Volosatova and is 45 years of age. He is a colonel in the KGB and is outwardly a vague and rather absent-minded person.

Vladimir Kalinin

"Attache" for protocol matters at the USSR Embassy in Spain. He is 26 years of age. He is married to Larisa Kalinina and has a daughter. He is in the habit of traveling a great deal "on business." He makes many of his journeys to the Canary Islands. He arrived in Spain 24 January 1978. He speaks Spanish very well.

Yuriy Goloviyatenko

He has been in Spain for just over 2 years. He is 40 years of age and married. His legal cover is that of "representative" of the APN agency.

Yuriy Bychkov

An "employee" of the Sovhispan Spanish-Soviet joint enterprise in Tenerife.

He is 50 years of age and has been living in the Canary Archipelago about 1 year; specifically, in Calle General Fanjul in Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

Yevgeniy Astakhov

"First secretary" at the Soviet Union's Embassy in Spain. He is 30-odd years of age. He is short, dark and uses spectacles for shortsightedness. He arrived in Madrid in March 1979, and his official post within the embassy is that of press

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attache. He is one of the people instructed by the Soviet Union to attend the preparatory meetings of the Madrid CSCE Conference. He speaks Spanish very well.

Boris Karpov

"Chief" of the Soviet Union's trade delegation in Spain. He arrived in Madrid 5 September 1977. He is married to Raisa Karpova and lives in the Calle Matias Montero, near the USSR Embassy.

Oleg Korolev

"Counselor" for politicomilitary affairs at the Soviet Union Embassy in Madrid.

He arrived in Spain 24 January 1978. He is married to Svetlana Koroleva and has two children. He lives in the Calle Caleruega in Madrid and practices various sports, including volleyball, squash and swimming.

Boris Remnev

"First secretary" at the USSR Embassy. He has been living in Spain since 8 July 1977. He is married to Raisa Remneva. His normal residence is in Calle Caleruega in Madrid. His task in Spain is that of replacing agent Gennadiy Svechnikov, who was expelled from the country at the beginning of 1978, accused of military espionage.

Like Gennadiy Svechnikov, Boris Remnev works for the GRU.

Oleg Pichugin

"Second secretary" at the embassy. He arrived in Madrid in March 1979 and is married to Mariya Pichugina. He lives at Calle Orense and uses a sky blue peugeot car for travel.

Vladimir Aksenov

"Attache" with the political section of the Soviet Embassy. He arrived in Spain 6 June 1978 to replace Yuriy Popov, an engineer 32 years of age who was working in the Weimar S.A. enterprise and was expelled from the country, accused of industrial and military espionage.

He is married to Natalya Aksenova and also lives in Calle Orense in Madrid.

Vladimir Bogachev

A KGB agent with the cover of "deputy chief" of the trade delegation of the Soviet Union Embassy in Spain.

He arrived in Madrid in September 1978. He is married to Galina Bogacheva, has two children and lives in Calle Caleruega.

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Leonid Chernysh

"First secretary" at the embassy, in charge of the "consular affairs" section.

He arrived in Spain 28 June 1977. He is married to Margarita Chernysha. He lives in Calle Pedro Muguruza in Madrid. He is the person responsible within the KGB "Residentura" for controlling the visas granted to Spanish citizens wishing to visit the Soviet Union and for drafting favorable or unfavorable reports about them.

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